Neural Correlates of Instrumental Contingency Learning: Differential Effects of Action–Reward Conjunction and Disjunction by Liljeholm, Mimi et al.
Behavioral/Systems/Cognitive
Neural Correlates of Instrumental Contingency Learning:
Differential Effects of Action–Reward Conjunction and
Disjunction
Mimi Liljeholm,1 Elizabeth Tricomi,2 John P. O’Doherty,1,3 and BernardW. Balleine4,5
1Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Computation and Neural Systems Program, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125,
2Department of Psychology, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey 07102, 3Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland,
4Department of Psychology, and the Brain Research Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024, and 5Brain and Mind Research
Institute, University of Sydney, New South Wales 2050, Australia
Contingency theories of goal-directed action propose that experienced disjunctions between an action and its specific consequences, as
well as conjunctions between these events, contribute to encoding the action–outcome association. Although considerable behavioral
research in rats and humans has provided evidence for this proposal, relatively little is known about the neural processes that contribute
to the two components of the contingency calculation. Specifically, while recent findings suggest that the influence of action–outcome
conjunctions on goal-directed learning is mediated by a circuit involving ventromedial prefrontal, medial orbitofrontal cortex, and
dorsomedial striatum, the neural processes that mediate the influence of experienced disjunctions between these events are unknown.
Here we show differential responses to probabilities of conjunctive and disjunctive reward deliveries in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, the dorsomedial striatum, and the inferior frontal gyrus. Importantly, activity in the inferior parietal lobule and the left middle
frontal gyrus varied with a formal integration of the two reward probabilities, P, as did response rates and explicit judgments of the
causal efficacy of the action.
Introduction
The capacity for goal-directed action depends critically on our
ability to detect and represent the causal relationship between
actions and their consequences. Evidence suggests that, while
such judgments are biased by conjunctions, or pairings, of an
action with its specific consequences, they are also highly sensi-
tive to disjunctions; behavioral studies have found that judg-
ments regarding the causal status of actions vary with the
likelihood of the outcome occurring noncontingently (i.e., in the
absence of the action and unsignaled) (Shanks and Dickinson,
1991). However, there has been little research investigating the
neural bases of the influence of noncontingent outcomes on the
encoding of the action–outcome relationship.
Instrumental contingency theory formalizes the integration of
response-contingent and noncontingent rewards by representing
the strength of the action–reward relationship as the difference
between the following two conditional probabilities: the proba-
bility of gaining a target reward (r) given that a specific action (a)
is performed and the probability of gaining the reward in the
absence of that action (a) [i.e., P P(ra) P(ra) (Ham-
mond, 1980). Hence, according to this view, when the two prob-
abilities are equal, the net action–reward contingency, and so the
causal status of the action, is nil, regardless of the number of
experienced action–reward conjunctions. The sensitivity of goal-
directed actions to the instrumental contingency has now been
convincingly demonstrated in both humans (Chatlosh et al.,
1985; Shanks and Dickinson, 1991) and rats (Hammond, 1980;
Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). Numerous studies have found
evidence of a selective decrease in the performance of an action as
the contingency is degraded by increasing P(ra) while keeping
P(ra) constant (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998), and, in humans,
explicit causal judgments vary with the instrumental contingency
across variations in both conditional probabilities (Chatlosh et
al., 1985).
At a neural level, studies in rats suggest that the influence of
contingency degradation is mediated by a circuit involving the
prelimbic prefrontal cortex and the dorsomedial striatum (DMS)
(Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Corbit and Balleine, 2003; Yin et
al., 2005). Consistent with these results, in a human imaging
study, Tanaka et al. (2008) found that activity in the medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC), the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC),
and the DMS increased with an increase in the contingency be-
tween pressing a button and receiving monetary reward. Activity
in mPFC also scaled linearly with explicit causal judgments,
which, in turn, were significantly correlated with the instrumen-
tal contingency. However, Tanaka et al. (2008) only assessed
changes in P(ra) and did not manipulate P(ra), which re-
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mained constant (at zero) across conditions. Thus, it is unknown
how activity in these areas relates to the representation of non-
contingent reward probabilities and their integration with
response-contingent ones.
The goal of the current study was, therefore, to assess the
neural basis of contingency detection in humans sampling across
a broad contingency space in whichwe systematically varied both
conditional probabilities, P(ra) and P(ra), across blocks of
training. Together with changes in neural activation, we assessed
the effects of these manipulations behaviorally, both on changes
in performance and in explicit causal judgment.
Materials andMethods
Subjects. Nineteen healthy right-handed volunteers (25  4 years old, 8
females) participated in the study. The volunteers were preassessed to
exclude those with a previous history of neurological or psychiatric ill-
ness. All subjects gave informed consent, and the study was approved by
the Institutional Review Board of the California Institute of Technology.
Experimental procedures. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects
were informed that they would be given the opportunity to earn a 25 cent
reward by pressing a key but that, while they were free to press the key as
often as they liked, each press would cost them 1 cent. They were further
instructed that the relationship between pressing the key and receiving
the 25 cent reward would vary across blocks and that, in some blocks, the
25 cent rewardmight be delivered in the absence of a response. To ensure
some familiarity with the task, subjects completed a single 80 s training
block, in which P(ra) equaled 0.18 and P(ra) equaled 0 (i.e., p 
0.18), before they entered the scanner.
Once in the scanner, each subject was presented with six different
contingency conditions; the values of the two conditional probabilities
for each of these conditions are listed in Table 1, together with the result-
ing P (rows 1–3). Due to methodological constraints imposed by the
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) method, each block of
training was divided into three 30 s “respond” intervals, during which
responding was unconstrained, interleaved with three 20 s “rest” inter-
vals, during which subjects were instructed to not respond (Fig. 1). To
ensure sufficient sampling of the response in each condition, and to avoid
any carryover of response suppression from low-contingency blocks, the
first respond interval in each block, henceforth
the baseline interval, always had the same, rel-
atively high, contingency as that used during
prescanning practice (i.e., p  0.18). The
subsequent two respond intervals within a
block, henceforth the experimental intervals,
shared one of the condition-specific contin-
gencies shown in Table 1. For each subject, the
entire set of six contingency blocks was pre-
sented in each of three sessions, separated by a
5min break duringwhich the subject remained
in the scanner, with the order of the blocks
randomized within sessions. Our task included
a cost for responding to encourage subjects to
regulate their performance according to the in-
strumental contingency.
Each time the participant pressed the key or
received a reward, a yellow fractal appeared. For
nonrewarded responses, thedurationof this frac-
tal was 250 ms, whereas, whenever a reward was
delivered, the yellow fractal remained on the
screen for 1 s, togetherwith a depictionof a quar-
ter and the text “Reward, You Win!” (Fig. 1).
While the yellow fractal, and associated informa-
tion, was displayed, no other events were gener-
ated; consequently, these brief periods imposed a
constraint on how closely a noncontingent re-
ward couldoccur to a response, in addition to the
time bin used to implement P(ra). Finally,
throughout each response interval, a running to-
tal of cents accumulatedwithin theblockwasdis-
played in the top right corner of the screen.
The default time bin for generating noncontingent rewards was 1000
ms; however, this time bin was modified for each subject based on the
average rate of responding. Specifically, for each subject and in each
session, the time bin in each block, except the first, was equal to the
average inter-response interval in the previous block, as long as this bin
was not 500 or 2000 ms, in which case the default of 1000 ms was
used. Although in some cases this generated experienced reward proba-
bilities that deviated substantially from programmed ones, it ensured
that even subjects who responded at very high rates received noncontin-
gent rewards. In addition to our primary behavioral measure of response
rate, judgments of the causal relationship between pressing the key and
receiving the 25 cent reward were collected at the end of each block, on a
scale ranging from 0 (pressing the key never caused the reward to occur)
to 100 (pressing the key always caused the reward to occur).
Imaging procedures. A 3 tesla scanner (MAGNETOM Trio; Siemens)
was used to acquire structural T1-weighted images and T2*-weighted
echo-planar images (repetition time  2.65 s; echo time  30 ms; flip
angle 90°; 45 transverse slices; matrix 64 64; field of view 192
mm; thickness  3 mm; slice gap  0 mm) blood-oxygen-level-
dependent (BOLD) contrast. To recover signal loss from dropout in the
mOFC (O’Doherty et al., 2002), each horizontal section was acquired at
30° to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure axis.
Behavioral data analysis.The conditional probabilities acted as param-
eters for a software probability generator and, consequently, the actual
Figure1. Illustrationof the task structure.a, Ablockwithina session, corresponding toa column inTable1. Eachblock consisted
of three 30 s respond intervals, one baseline interval, and two experimental intervals corresponding to one of the conditions listed
in Table 1 (see text). The response intervals were interleavedwith three 20 s rest intervals. Causal ratingswere collected at the end
of the block. b, Example of events within a respond interval. Each event triggered the display of a yellow square, which remained
on the screen for 250 ms for nonrewarded key presses and for 1 s for reward deliveries. Response-contingent rewards were
delivered immediately upon pressing the key. In addition, a running total of the amount of money earned within a block was
continuously displayed in the upper right corner of the screen (data not shown in figure).
Table 1. Programmed conditional probabilities and the resultingP for each of
the six blocks making up a session with P(ra) specified per second
Blocks 1 2 3 4 5 6
P(r a) 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.18
P(ra) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.18
DP 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.00
Mean P(r a) 0 (0) 0.06 (0.05) 0.12 (0.04) 0.17 (0.08) 0.18 (0.10) 0.18 (0.15)
Mean P(ra) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.05 (0.06) 0.12 (0.10) 0.15 (0.13)
Mean CJ 9.1 (14.0) 24.6 (23.7) 35.7 (25.3) 38.8 (25.7) 32.1 (30.7) 30.1 (27.1)
Rows 1–3 show the values of the programmed conditional probabilities (i.e., probability of reward, r, given the
presence vs absence of the action) and the resultingP, for each of the six blocksmaking up a sessionwith P(ra)
specified per second. Rows 4 and 5 show the mean experienced conditional probabilities respectively, while row 6
shows mean causal judgment (CJ) (SD).
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values of P(ra) and P(ra) sometimes deviated from those listed in
Table 1. To equate temporal assumptions across subjects and sessions, we
specified a sampling period of 1 s, coding each of the relevant events (i.e.,
responses, response-contingent rewards, and noncontingent rewards) as
either present or absent in each such period. We then computed P
based on the resulting event frequencies, collapsing across the two exper-
imental intervals making up each block. Response rates associated with
these objective contingency values were computed as presses per second,
correcting for the time consumed by reward-deliveries (i.e., 1 s per re-
ward). Finally, the six blocks were ranked according to P values, and
response rates and causal ratings for the ranked blocks were entered into
a contingency  session repeated-measures ANOVA. For a more fine-
grained analysis, we also computed contingencies and response rates for
each 10 s period, across blocks and sessions, and assessed the correlation
between these variables for each subject.
Imaging data analysis. Image processing and statistical analyses were
performed using SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first
four volumes of images were discarded to avoid T1 equilibrium effects.
All remaining volumes were corrected for differences in slice acquisition,
realigned to the first volume, spatially normalized to the Montreal Neu-
rological Institute (MNI) echo-planar imaging template, and spatially
smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (8 mm, full width at half-maximum).
We used a high-pass filter with cutoff at 128 s. Our imaging analysis
focused on the following two basic questions: (1) is there a neural signal
that maps onto the instrumental contingency across variations in both
conjunctive and disjunctive reward probabilities?; and (2) are the two
components of the contingency correlated with distinct patterns of neu-
ral activity? Following Tanaka et al. (2008) to assess changes in neural
activity over time as a function of local fluctuations in the relevant vari-
ables, we constructed two sets of subject-specific fMRI design matrices,
each with an onset regressor modeling a BOLD response over 10 s peri-
ods. In one model, the two conditional probabilities, computed for each
period, were entered as parametric modulators, and in the other P was
entered as a singlemodulator. In bothmodels, response rates and reward
deliveries associated with each 10 s period were convolved with a canon-
ical hemodynamic response function and entered, without orthogonal-
ization, as regressors of no interest together with six additional regressors
accounting for the residual effects of head motion. All regressors of in-
terest were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function.
Group-level random-effects statistics were generated by entering con-
trasts of parameter estimates for the differentmodulators into a between-
subjects analysis.
Small volume corrections (SVCs) were performed on three a priori
regions of interest using a 10 mm sphere; the center coordinates were
obtained by averaging across several studies (Table 2). All of these areas
have been identified in highly relevant studies assessing goal-directed
instrumental action-selection, as follows: (1)medial orbitofrontal cortex
(x, y, z  3, 33,19); (2) medial prefrontal cortex (x, y, z  7, 51, 5)
(O’Doherty et al., 2003; Hampton et al., 2006; Valentin et al., 2007;
Tanaka et al., 2008; Gla¨scher et al., 2009); and (3) right (x, y, z 13, 11,
11) and left (x, y, z9, 7, 4) caudate nucleus (CN) (O’Doherty et al.,
2003; Tricomi et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2008). All other areas were
reported at p 0.05, using cluster size thresholding (CST) to adjust for
multiple comparisons (Forman et al., 1995). Monte Carlo simulations,
implemented by the Analysis of Functional NeuroImaging AlphaSim
program, were used to determine cluster size and significance. Using an
individual voxel probability threshold of p 0.001 indicated that using a
minimum cluster size of 134 MNI-transformed voxels resulted in an
overall significance of p 0.05.
To separate effects due to the processing of conditional probabilities
from those reflecting encoding of P, we conducted an exclusion analy-
sis, masking the contrasts of conditional probabilities with the P con-
trast; specifically, with a positive contrast for P(ra) and a negative
contrast for P(ra). Because this analysis involves accepting the null
hypothesis that neural activity does not correlate withP, we used a very
liberal threshold of 0.1 for these masking contrasts.
To eliminate nonindependence bias for plots of parameter estimates, a
leave-one-subject-out (LOSO) (Esterman et al., 2010) approach was
used inwhich 19 general linearmodels (GLMs)were runwith one subject
left out in each and with each GLM defining the voxel cluster for the
subject that was left out. The relevant local maxima were then used to
extract  weights for a range of modulator values for each subject and
session, and these were averaged to plot overall effect sizes. Extreme
modulator values for which70% of data points were missing (0.5
and 0.5 for the contingency modulator, and 0.5 for the two condi-
tional probabilities) were excluded from the plots.
Results
Behavioral results
The mean causal ratings and mean objective conditional proba-
bilities (based on actually experienced event frequencies) are
shown for each programmed condition in Table 1. Note that, for
conditions across which P(ra) varies while P(ra) remains con-
stant and high, mean ratings also remain high and relatively un-
changed, suggesting a bias toward P(ra). However, these mean
causal ratings more likely reflect individual differences in the
objective variable values. Specifically, objective values of P(ra)
and P(ra) in individual blocks differed substantially from the
mean objective values computed across subjects and sessions, as
Table 2. Coordinates for ROIs
ROI x, y, z References
Ventromedial PFC
Medial OFC 2, 30,20 Tanaka et al. (2008)
6, 24,21 Glaescher et al. (2009)
9, 27,12
3, 36,24 Valentin et al (2007)
12, 36,18 O’Doherty et al. (2003)
9, 42,12
0, 33,24 Hampton et al (2006)
Medial PFC 6, 52,10 Tanaka et al. (2008)
3, 54,3 Glaescher et al. (2009)
6, 30,9
24, 45,6 Valentin et al (2007)
9, 66, 6 O’Doherty et al. (2003)
6, 57,6 Hampton et al (2006)
Caudate nucleus
Right CN 6, 10, 20 Tanaka et al. (2008)
9, 16, 4 Tricomi et al. (2004)
21, 0, 18 O’Doherty et al. (2003)
15, 18, 3
Left CN 12, 11, 8 Tricomi et al. (2004)
6, 3, 0 O’Doherty et al. (2003)
Table 3. Coordinates and significance levels for contrasts
Region
MNI coordinates
p valueX y z
Negative correlation withP
Left SPL 42 51 57 *
Left IPL 51 54 18 *
MFG 27 0 54 *
Positive correlation with P(ra)
Left MFG 48 21 36 *
Right MFG 45 24 33 *
Medial FG 6 24 54 *
Right pSTG 54 39 15 *
Right IPL 54 60 48 *
Left pCN 9 0 15 *
Red Nucleus 3 24 3 *
Lingual Gyrus 6 84 6 *
Right IFG 27 24 12 *
Positive correlation with P(r a)
Right mPFC 12 57 6 **
Right aCN 15 9 15 **
pSTG, Posterior superior temporal gyrus. *p 0.05, CST; **p 0.05, SVC.
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well as from the programmed values. Furthermore, while large
deviations in the objective values sometimes resulted in negative
contingencies, the rating scale did not allow participants to indi-
cate a preventive causal relationship, thus biasing judgments in a
positive direction. Consistent with this interpretation, when
mean causal ratings were computed solely based on blocks in
which both objective conditional probabilities were close to the
programmed values (within a 0.05 deviation), mean ratings
equaled 46.2, 32.5, and 18.8, respectively, for the conditions listed
in columns 4 to 6 of Table 1, suggesting amuch stronger influence
of P(ra). All of our statistical analyses, and all subsequently
reported descriptive statistics, are based on objective, rather than
programmed, variable values.
As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 2, mean response
rates clearly decrease with a decrease in mean objective contin-
gency (F(1,18)  38.8, p  0.001). Simple contrasts revealed that
all differences between adjacent contingency levels were signifi-
cant ( p  0.05), except for that between the second and third
levels ( p  0.07). The mean response rate and mean objective
contingency for the baseline intervals were both high (1.4 and
0.22, respectively) relative to those in the majority of experimen-
tal conditions. Comparable results were observed with respect to
the explicit causal judgments (Fig. 2, bottom), which also
decreased linearly as a function of objective contingency (F(1,18) 
47.5, p  0.001), with all differences between adjacent contin-
gency levels reaching significance ( p  0.05), except for that
between the first and second levels ( p  0.20). There was no
significant effect of session, nor any significant interactions, for
either response rates or causal judgments (all F values1.0). The
mean difference, across subjects and sessions, between the two
experimental intervals within each block was 0.32 with an SD of
0.36. Notably, such variations in response rate were likely due to
the fact that the experienced contingency also varied across these
two intervals; indeed, differences in response rates across the in-
tervals within a block were highly correlated, across subjects and
sessions, with concomitant differences in contingency ( p 
0.001). Finally, the correlations between P and response rates,
computed across 10 s bins for each subject, were highly signifi-
cant for the vast majority of subjects ( p  0.001 for 16 of 19
subjects; p 0.05 for 2 of the remaining 3 subjects). In summary,
our results replicate those of Shanks and Dickinson (1991) and
Chatlosh et al. (1985); both response rates and explicit causal
judgments showed a systematic decline with a decrease in objec-
tive contingency.
Imaging results: P
Coordinates and significance levels for all contrasts assessing
parametric modulation are shown in Table 3. We first tested for
areas showing changes in activity related to the instrumental con-
tingency. Our results indicated that three distinct areas tracked
contingency values: the left middle frontal gyrus and the left su-
perior and inferior parietal lobules. Interestingly, we found that
activity in these areas correlated negatively with this parametric
modulator (CST, all p values 0.05) (Fig. 3a,b), such that their
activity was greatest when subjects experienced low (including
negative) contingencies and was weakest when subjects experi-
enced high contingences. Bilateral activity was seen in all three
areas at an uncorrected threshold of 0.005. No voxels survived
our statistical threshold for the reverse contrast, testing for areas
in which activity correlated positively with contingency.
Imaging results: conditional probabilities
We next tested for areas showing changes in activity related to
P(ra) and found significant responses throughout the lateral
frontal cortex bilaterally, the medial frontal cortex, the right pos-
terior superior temporal gyrus, the right posterior intraparietal
sulcus, and the left posterior caudate (Levitt et al., 2002) (CST, all
p values 0.05). Activity emerged bilaterally in all of these areas,
except for that in the posterior caudate nucleus, at an uncorrected
threshold of 0.005. Activity also emerged in themedial prefrontal
cortex [(x, y, z  12, 42, 3)], although this did not quite reach
significance ( p 0.001, uncorrected).Moreover, only the effects
found in the right inferior frontal cortex (IFG) and the left pos-
terior CN (pCN) survived masking with an exclusive, negative
contrast for P, thresholded at 0.1, suggesting that activity in
these areas is specific to a representation of P(ra) (Fig. 4a). To
rule out overall reward rate as the source of observed neural
activity, we also conducted an additional analysis in which we
included this variable in the design matrix and found that the
significant effects still emerged at the corrected threshold of 0.05.
The test for areas showing changes in activity related to P(ra)
revealed significant effects in the rightmPFC (SVC, p 0.05) and
the right anterior CN (aCN) (SVC, p  0.05). An uncorrected
threshold of 0.005 did not render these effects bilateral, and only
the effects found in the caudate survived masking with an exclu-
sive positive contrast for P, again thresholded at 0.1 (Fig. 4b).
Imaging results: additional region-of-interest analyses
To further assess the effects found for P in the inferior parietal
lobule, we anatomically defined this region, in each hemisphere,
usingWFUPickAtlas (Maldjian et al., 2003).We then usedMars-
Bar (Brett et al., 2002) to perform region-of-interest (ROI) anal-
Figure 2. Mean presses per second (top) and mean causal ratings (bottom) across blocks
sorted in descending order by objective contingency. Blocks were sorted separately for each
subject and session before themean contingencywas computed. Thus, while all subjects expe-
rienced one block in each session for which both objective conditional probabilities (and conse-
quently contingency) were zero, the position of this block in the descending order of objective
contingency values varied across subjects and sessions, resulting in a nonzero mean for each
block listed on the x-axis. Error bar SEM.
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yses of a (low-high) contrast and found
significant effects in both the left and right
inferior parietal lobules (IPLs) (both p
values  0.05), confirming our previous
finding that activity in this area decreases
as the contingency increases. We also
performed ROI analyses contrasting
high with low values for the two condi-
tional probabilities within our caudate
ROIs, as well as within an ROI defined
across the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (vmPFC) (consisting of the mOFC
and adjacentmPFC regions defined in Ta-
ble 2). For P(ra), these analyses yielded
significant effects in the left caudate nu-
cleus ( p 0.05). For P(ra), we found sig-
nificant effects in both the left and right
caudate, as well as in the vmPFC (all p
values0.05).
Discussion
When trying to determine how effective
an action is in producing some reward, it
is important to consider the following two
conditional probabilities: the probability
that the action is followed by that reward,
P(ra); and the probability that the reward
occurs in the absence of that action,
P(ra). The behavioral influence of both
response-contingent and noncontingent
rewards on free operant responding has
been convincingly demonstrated in both
humans and rats, and has been central to
claims about the role of causal knowledge
in the performance of goal-directed ac-
tions (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998).
However, while there has been extensive
research on the neural processes underly-
ing the influence of response-contingent
rewards on action selection, what we
know about the neural bases of process-
ing noncontingent rewards and their in-
tegration with response-contingent ones is
limited to the results of a relatively small
body of studies in rodents (Yin et al.,
2005). The current study used fMRI to investigate the neural
substrates of action–outcome contingency learning in humans,
with a focus on identifying areas responsible for inte-
grating information about response-contingent and noncontin-
gent reward probabilities. Consistent with previous results (e.g.,
Tanaka et al., 2008), we found that neural activity in the vmPFC
and the right aCN encoded the probability with which an action
would be followed by reward. In contrast, information about
the probability of noncontingent reward was processed by two
separate neural circuits: activity in the IFG and the left pCN
was found to vary with the probability of receiving reward in
the absence of any action. Finally, activity in the inferior and
superior parietal lobules (I/SPLs) and the middle frontal gyrus
(MFG) varied with instrumental contingency, a formal inte-
gration of the two reward probabilities, as did response rates
and subjective causal judgments.
Our finding that neural activity in the right aCN and mPFC
varied with the probability of response-contingent reward deliv-
ery, P(ra), is consistent with that of Tanaka et al. (2008) and
supports the suggestion that these structures are functionally ho-
mologous to the rodent DMS and prelimbic cortex, respectively
(Balleine and O’Doherty, 2009). Notably, the mPFC effects did
not survivemasking by the contingency contrast, suggesting that,
rather than just encoding P(ra), this area might contribute to
contingency computations; indeed, activity in mPFC was also
found for P(ra), albeit below our threshold for statistical
significance. Additional evidence for a role of mPFC in reward
integration comes from studies showing that activity this area
correlates with the average value of distinct stimuli (Wunder-
lich et al., 2010), with the subjective valuation of delayed re-
wards (Kable and Glimcher, 2007), and with the relative
decision value between monetary and social rewards (Smith et
al., 2010).
We also found that activity in the left pCN, but not the aCN,
varied with the probability of noncontingent rewards, indicating
that distinct striatal areas may support estimation of the respec-
Figure 3. Activation related to instrumental contingency.a,b, Voxels showing significant negative correlationwith the instru-
mental contingencywere found in the left MFG (x, y, z30, 3, 57; p 0.05, corrected) (a), and the SPL (x, y, z42,51,
57; p 0.05, corrected) and IPL (x, y, z51,57, 18; p 0.05, corrected) (b). Bar plots showmeans ( y-axes) estimated
at each LOSO peak voxel and averaged across subjects and sessions. The first two rows on the bottom x-axis list the boundaries of
the range of contingency values for each bin, with the top row indicating the lower boundary and the bottom row indicating the
upper, inclusive boundary. The third and fourth rows list the mean experienced values for the two conditional probabilities
respectively in each bin. Error bar SEM.
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tive reward probabilities. Importantly, a similar dissociation be-
tween anterior and posterior dorsomedial striatum has
previously been demonstrated in rodents; Yin et al. (2005) found
that inactivation of the posterior DMS abolished sensitivity to
contingency degradation (i.e., to the delivery of noncontingent
rewards) while inactivation of the anterior DMS had no effect.
Likewise, Corbit and Janak (2010) found that the posterior DMS
was critical for the acquisition of both response–outcome and
stimulus–outcome relationships, while the anterior DMS ap-
peared to be needed only for response–outcome encoding. The
current results suggest that a comparable heterogeneity might
exist along the anterior–posterior axis of the human caudate nu-
cleus (i.e., across the head and body of the caudate), providing
converging evidence for the proposal that brain systems respon-
sible for the modulation of goal-directed actions based on varia-
tions in instrumental contingency are highly conserved across
species (Balleine andO’Doherty, 2010). Consistent with previous
work (Shanks and Dickinson, 1991), our behavioral results, de-
picted in Figure 2, show a clear decrease in response rates with a
decrease in the difference between the probabilities of response-
contingent and noncontingent rewards (i.e., with instrumental
contingency). To explore the neural basis of this response mod-
ulation, we tested for regions correlating with the local contin-
gency computed over 10 s intervals. We found that activity
increased with a decrease in contingency in the I/SPL and MFG.
Although several recent neuroimaging studies have implicated
the I/SPL and MFG in the representation of action–reward con-
tingencies (Delgado et al., 2005; Schlund and Cataldo, 2005;
Koch et al., 2008; Schlund and Ortu, 2010), they have primarily
explored the role of these areas in reward
predictability. For example, Delgado et al.
(2005) and Koch et al. (2008) found that
activity in the IPL increased as the proba-
bility of being correct, and thus of reward,
given one of two alternative actions de-
creased from 1.0 to 0.5 across stimulus
conditions. They interpreted these results
as reflecting a recruitment of areas re-
sponsible for controlled cognitive pro-
cesses due to the decrease in reward
predictability. Without additional as-
sumptions, it is difficult to apply the con-
cept of reward predictability to the
distinction between response-contingent
and noncontingent rewards that is the fo-
cus of the current study. Nonetheless, we
note that this account fails to explain our
finding that activity in the I/SPL appears
to decrease as P(ra) increased toward 0.5,
while P(ra) remained relatively un-
changed. In other words, that activity in
these areas decreased with a decrease in
the predictability of response-contingent
reward (Fig. 3b, last two bars and bottom
rows of the effect-size plots).
In the current task, the decision to re-
spond or not is based on the relative prob-
ability of reward in the presence and the
absence of the action.Note that this is akin
to choosing between two alternative ac-
tions based on their respective reward
probabilities; in both cases, an integration
of distinct sources of information is re-
quired in order for optimal response strategies to develop. In a
recent neurophysiology study, Seo et al. (2009) updated the indi-
vidual values of two alternative actions using reinforcement
learning theory (Sutton and Barto, 1998) andmodeled the differ-
ence between action value functions as a decision variable in a
free-choice task. Recording the activity of neurons in a subregion
of the IPL (the lateral intraparietal cortex) in rhesus monkeys,
they found that a substantial percentage of these neurons
changed their activity according to the difference between the
two action value functions. Interestingly, using a similar task but
recording from the monkey striatum, Samejima et al. (2005)
found that a greater number of striatal neurons were selective to
reward expectancies associated with one but not the other action
than were tuned to the difference between action values. To our
knowledge, the current results provide the first simultaneous re-
gions respectively. Further studies are needed to clarify the exact
role of the implicated parietostriatal circuit in goal-directed ac-
tion selection, andhow it relates to the frontostriatal network that
has been the focus of rodent lesion studies of instrumental con-
tingency learning.
Although contingency computations are considered central to
goal-directed learning, a couple of additional factors known to
strongly influence instrumental performance likely contributed
to the current findings. For example, it is possible that the imme-
diacy of response-contingent reward delivery (i.e., the strong ac-
tion–reward contiguity) used here played a role in the estimation
of P(ra) (Shanks and Dickinson, 1991), and consequently in the
observed correlation between this variable and activity in the
anterior caudate. It is also important to note that instrumental
Figure 4. Activations related to the two conditional probabilities. a, Results from a contrast testing formodulation by P(ra)
with exclusivemasking by the negative contrast forP. Effects were found in the left posterior caudate (x, y, z9, 0, 12; p
0.05, CST) and the IFG (x, y, z 42, 18, 12); p 0.05, corrected). b, Results from a contrast testing for modulation by P(ra), with
exclusivemasking by the positive contrast forP. Significant activationwas found in the right anterior caudate (x, y, z 15, 9, 15;
p 0.05) SVC with a 10 mm sphere centered at 6, 10, and 21 (Tanaka et al., 2008). Significant activation was also found in the
vmPFC (x, y, z 12, 57,6; p 0.05) SVCwith a 10mm sphere centered at 6, 57, and6 (Hampton et al., 2006)], but this did
not survive masking. Bar plots show mean s ( y-axes) estimated at each LOSO peak voxel and averaged across subjects and
sessions for the range of modulator values listed on the bottom x-axes. Error bar SEM.
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contingency is closely related to the utility of performing an ac-
tion; recall that, in the current study, whereas noncontingent
rewards were free, response-contingent rewards (of equal mag-
nitude) were associated with a small monetary cost and, presum-
ably, also with an effort-based cost. The IPL has been previously
implicated in the integration of reward and risk (Ernst et al.,
2004) and in response selection based on reward maximization
(Bush et al., 2002); it is possible, therefore, that the currently
reported effects in this area reflect the incorporation of noncon-
tingent rewards into a cost–benefit analysis, rather than the com-
putation of contingency per se. Further research is needed to
determine how neural correlates of instrumental contingency
learning relate to the encoding of action–reward contiguity and
to the estimation of utility.
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